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PROPERTY, DURESS, AND CONSENSUAL
RELATIONSHIPS
David Blankfein-Tabachnick*
Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law. By Seana
Valentine Shiffrin. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press. 2014. Pp. xi, 223. $35.
Introduction
Professor Seana Valentine Shiffrin1 has produced an exciting new book,
Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law. Shiffrin’s previous rigor-
ous, careful, and morally sensitive work spans contract law,2 intellectual
property,3 and the freedoms of association4 and expression.5 Speech Matters
is in line with Shiffrin’s signature move: we ought to reform our social prac-
tices and legal and political institutions to, in various ways, address or ac-
commodate moral values—here, a stringent moral prohibition against lying,
a strident principle of promissory fidelity, that is, the principle that one
ought to keep one’s promises, and the general value of veracity.
The book grows out of Shiffrin’s Hempel Lectures at Princeton Univer-
sity and honorary lectures she has given at Cornell and New York Universi-
ties. Shiffrin cotaught a seminar with the late Professor Ronald Dworkin,
which discussed a prepublication draft of the book (pp. ix–x). The volume is
organized into six essentially independent chapters or lectures. Chapters
One, Two, and Six began as independent, stand-alone lectures; Shiffrin
crafted Chapters Three, Four, and Five to further expand on the arguments
of One and Six (p. 4).
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Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; Affiliated
Transnational Faculty, Peking University School of Transnational Law (China). I am grateful to
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versity of California, Los Angeles.
2. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev.
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While the volume bears a unifying theme, Shiffrin intended the chapters
to retain their independence as distinct lectures, and she welcomes readers
to delve into the chapters independently of one another (p. 4). Speech Mat-
ters is, at its core, a rich discussion of moral agency and the normative values
of sincerity, truth telling, promissory fidelity, and the effect they ought to
bear on personal and social relations, and political and legal institutions.
This Review brings forward this unifying theme and provides a critical ap-
praisal, contrasting Shiffrin’s stridently Kantian approach with an alternative
foundationally deontic, if less severe, distributive approach.
I. Agency
A. Channels to Communication
Shiffrin is concerned with “moral agency” (p. 1). It is not only social
cooperation and human flourishing, but moral agency itself that requires a
fragile domain of sincerity and trust. This domain, Speech Matters holds,
requires an extraordinarily stringent social and legal prohibition against ly-
ing and the protection of fidelity (pp. 2, 26). “The means of successful com-
munication are crucial . . . mechanisms for the most valuable human
endeavors—from establishing and conducting personal relationships, to en-
gaging in cooperative activities . . . .” (p. 25). Shiffrin argues that
“[p]reserving and protecting these means therefore figure among our funda-
mental moral priorities” (p. 25). But Speech Matters’s unique and somewhat
counterintuitive claim is that a failure to recognize an extraordinarily strin-
gent—indeed nearly absolute—prohibition on lying,6 “precludes . . . moral
relations . . . by obstructing the sort of mutual understanding[s] . . . based
on rational communication.”7 That failure thereby obstructs the channels
required for moral progress and the sorts of mutual engagement, which
serve as the precondition to giving normative effect to our social practices
and legal and political institutions.8
Given the focus on pathways to communication, one may feel
tempted—indeed invited—to conclude that Shiffrin offers a straightforward
consequentialist or outcome-oriented account of the freedom of speech; af-
ter all, her view plainly involves “delving into the moral purposes and value
of communication” and seemingly justifies the value of open channels of
communication in consequentialist terms (p. 26). Yet Shiffrin is clear: she
aims at a view that is not “render[ed] . . . consequentialist.”9 To understand
6. E.g., p. 2 (“I will defend a qualified absolutism about lying . . . .”).
7. P. 23; see also p. 1 (making clear that “[p]rotecting . . . channel[s] of mutual access
must . . . be a substantial moral priority”).
8. See p. 26 (arguing that we can secure and protect the social conditions under which
we possess moral agency by maintaining the presumptions that enable successful moral
agency).
9. P. 1 (“I hope to unify a variety of issues about communicative ethics and to motivate
the outlines of a principled, nonconsequentialist approach to these issues—in particular to
issues about lying, promissory fidelity, and the freedom of speech.”).
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the normative foundations of communication, it is essential to consider
communication’s normative relationship to moral agency.10 Absent open
channels or pathways, for Shiffrin, it is not just that our communication
becomes constrained and weak—as if we had insufficient bandwidth to sup-
port our streaming video—it is, rather, that open pathways are a deontic
precondition to understanding ourselves and others as thinking persons, or
at base, understanding one another as deliberative moral agents (p. 26). For
Shiffrin, there is a fundamental responsibility to secure the conditions under
which moral agency obtains and that this agency requires reliable and pre-
cise communication.11
Shiffrin’s nonconsequentialist insight is subtle: our very ability to con-
template our aims, goals, plans, or duties and to make the relevant calcula-
tions and trade-offs required to achieve our outcome-oriented goals—
admittedly, often an empirical task—is predicated on moral agency. This
agency only fully exists, however, under certain social conditions—those
embodying the pathways to precise communication (p. 26). Our deontic re-
sponsibility, then, is to secure and protect these social conditions through
compliance with a stringent conception of the lying prohibition and a nearly
absolute commitment to the values of sincerity, veracity, and a revised con-
ception of promissory fidelity (pp. 1, 26). Stringent adherence to this set of
commitments constructs pathways to communication and the normative
basis of freedom of expression.12 The source of normativity in communica-
tion is not merely a function of consequences, but derives from a deontic
conception of moral agency itself.13
The argument is elegant and operates at a high level of abstraction. But
to make the view concrete, Shiffrin introduces an instructive metaphor con-
cerning the value of truthful communication even in the context of “those
who intend to do wrong” (p. 24): “the wrong of the lie as a generalization of
the wrong of perfidy and, in particular, of the abuse or misuse of the white
flag in war” (p. 24). Even in the context of war, the white flag—the signal of
willingness to surrender or negotiate—commands respect. Once a party
raises the white flag, it is impermissible to attack the messenger carrying the
flag, and it is a crime of war to use the white flag to surprise or sabotage.
“Even between parties who are authorized in some sense to kill one another,
the white flag is regarded as sacrosanct.”14
10. P. 26 (“My argument is not that we must attempt to maximize the realization of
moral communication. Nor is my argument that the permissibility of misrepresentations
hangs on . . . whether they . . . do or do not increase or diminish episodes of moral
behavior.”).
11. P. 26 (“[T]he fundamental responsibility to secure and protect the individual and
social conditions under which we possess . . . agency and . . . understand and acquit our moral
duties exerts a lexical priority. . . . Understanding and acquitting the full range of our moral
duties depends upon having reliable forms of precise communication.”).
12. See pp. 1, 26.
13. See pp. 1, 26.
14. P. 24. Michael Walzer initially argues in line with Shiffrin’s near absolutism: “A sol-
dier who surrenders enters into an agreement with his captors: he will stop fighting if they will
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The motivation behind this convention is that “even when we are at
each other’s throats and even when we are grappling with evil” it is essential
that we preserve a way out (pp. 24–25). Shiffrin vividly describes the moral
necessity involved: “We must preserve an exit through which we could nego-
tiate an end to conflict and move toward reconciliation using rational dis-
course,” as opposed to merely “relying . . . upon the crude tools of violence,
domination, and extermination. To avoid . . . devastations and massacres
and to protect the possibility of peace, an absolutely trustworthy method of
communication must be preserved” (p. 25).
While these are illustrative consequentialist observations, Shiffrin’s posi-
tion remains subtly deontic: we have an initial moral duty or responsibility
to construct and maintain the social conditions necessary to human agency
and flourishing (pp. 1, 26). But this agency requires open channels of com-
munication that themselves require stringent requirements of sincerity,
promissory fidelity, and a nearly absolute prohibition against lying (pp. 3,
26). Despite the palpable temptation to a consequentialist interpretation of
communicative duty and, in turn, freedom of expression, Shiffrin’s account
is—at the foundation—duty- and agency-based. The deontology lies in the
initial duties and responsibilities that, in turn, require that the pathways to
communication be constructed openly.
B. Trade-Offs in Constructing Open Channels
But demonstrating that the argument is deontological at its foundation
is one thing; justifying a normative demand for rigorous honesty—near ab-
solutism in the duties of veracity, sincerity, and in promissory fidelity even
under extraordinary or quite extreme  conditions—is another. Shiffrin’s
move from basic deontic notions of duty and responsibility to the social
demand for channels of communication constructed to pattern nearly abso-
lutist duties may be too quick; the very values that serve moral agency and
that lead to moral progress and flourishing, in her view, may at times serve
to defeat the strength of the very duties of veracity that are in question.
Interestingly, Shiffrin begins with—but ultimately departs from—a
somewhat Rawlsian spirit: the idea that the above stated preconditions to
full moral agency take a “lexical priority” over other values (p. 26). But it is
unclear that stringent adherence to fidelity and sincerity will do the norma-
tive work Shiffrin asks of them. It seems more likely that interpersonal rela-
tions and social and legal institutions required to support the sort of thick
moral agency Shiffrin has in mind must answer to a complete set of values
accord him . . . ‘benevolent quarantine.’ Since it is usually made under extreme duress, this is
an agreement that would have no moral consequences at all in time of peace.” Michael
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 46
(4th ed. 2006). But, “[i]n war it does have consequences.” Id. Walzer then argues in a vein less
absolutist than Shiffrin: “It is not easy to see all this as the simple assertion of a moral princi-
ple. It is the work of men and women (with moral principles in mind) adapting to the realities
of war, making arrangements, striking bargains,” id., although he ultimately notes, consistent
with Shiffrin, that “[t]he war convention is written in absolutist terms.” Id. at 47.
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that are broader than veracity, and also must importantly embody a concep-
tion of the duty of sincerity significantly less stringent than Shiffrin’s. Moral
agency of the sort Shiffrin embraces requires a commitment to a range of
blended and balanced basic liberties, as well as material well-being. For a
view like Shiffrin’s, the question is how stringent duties, however norma-
tively appealing in isolation, might fit in such a scheme.15
So while it is clear that reliable mechanisms and channels for communi-
cation are necessary to have freedom of speech and communication, it is less
clear that Shiffrin’s stringent prohibition on lying maps in any one-to-one
fashion in constructing and maintaining such channels and, in certain in-
stances, it may run counter to the preservation of such channels. The prohi-
bition on lying—as well as the value of free speech itself—must in some
circumstances be traded off against other crucial basic liberties, say, when
security of the person is significantly at issue. A nearly unyielding account of
the lying prohibition—in service to freedom of speech—may ultimately be
too wooden to find its home in a complete set of basic liberties and freedoms
that in conjunction with one another provide a well-balanced, complete sys-
tem of protected liberty.
The open channels of communication needed for moral agency, as Shif-
frin recognizes, may require more than mere adherence to a strict concep-
tion of promissory fidelity, sincerity, and veracity; such duties cannot do the
work alone. To construct full pathways to moral agency, one must also ad-
dress aspects of private ordering: economic institutions and the details of
property ownership and entitlement, as Shiffrin does. But my concern is not
just that such duties are not enough, but, crucially, that the strength of such
duties, for which she advocates, may itself run counter to moral agency,
rather than being necessary to it.
II. Applications
Shiffrin’s abstract argument has significant, specific ramifications for
the regulation—indeed reform—of our social and interpersonal relations
and legal and political institutions. Shiffrin holds that even in the context of
extreme nonideal circumstances, conditions that many would describe as
dire, our duties to ensure truthful and sincere communication and fidelity
remain well-engaged. The book aptly acknowledges that duties of sincerity
and the like, if they are to be taken seriously, must hold short of requiring
that one become a criminal accomplice, say, via a commitment to rigorous
honesty with would-be criminals (p. 36). But, perhaps shockingly to some,
for Shiffrin, such duties do require that along important dimensions we
ought to remain truthful even with an inquiring aggressor intending the
15. See John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 Q.J. Econ. 633, 640 (1974).
(“[Basic] liberties have a central range of application within which they can be limited and
adjusted only because they clash with other basic liberties. None of these liberties, therefore, is
absolute, since they may conflict with one another; but, however they are adjusted to form
one’s system, this system is to be the same for all. . . . Liberties not on the list [of basic
liberties], for example, [include] the right to own property and freedom of contract . . . .”)
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violent or murderous attack of innocents. In a similar vein, certain commu-
nications, even those with a mugger—at least implicitly threatening one’s
life—ought to remain truthful (pp. 35–36). And perhaps most boldly and
counterintuitively, in a supreme defense of “fidelity,” Shiffrin maintains that
morality demands that we ought to keep certain promises offered under
genuine duress, even if, divergently, the state should not enforce contracts
entered into under similar conditions (pp. 47–49, 68–70). The book also
maintains that freedom of speech doctrine should not protect genuine in-
tentional lies16 and that our social and legal institutions, specifically universi-
ties and policing agencies, become self-effacing if they lie—even when in
service of urgent and (ostensibly) overridingly laudable goals.17
A. Lying
Shiffrin addresses the interpersonal moral prohibition on lying, a rich
discussion that effectively provides a background for the discussion of
promising, duress, and contract law that follows. Shiffrin maintains that ly-
ing is wrong along three dimensions. First, lies wrong listeners by deliber-
ately presenting listeners with unreliable warrant to believe, which creates a
gap in knowledge between listeners and the speakers, precluding the possi-
bility of an equal partnership in full moral engagement (p. 23). Second, a
liar harms himself by self-imposing isolation from his listener (p. 24). And
finally, the lies wrong humanity; the maxim for action from which the liar’s
act emanates embodies “disrespect to our collective interest and [our] duty
to maintain reliable channels of communication and the liar’s action begins,
concretely, to sow seeds of doubt in one another’s testimony” (p. 24).
But Shiffrin analyzes these characteristics of lying in isolation. The hard
work comes under less than ideal conditions in which misrepresentations
are not told in isolation, but in their full social context. “To identify these
three facets of the wrong of the lie does not yet confront the special issues
raised by communication with those who intend to do wrong” (p. 24; em-
phases added). After all, it is under these special  circumstances—in which
the moral stakes are high and one’s own well-being or that of innocent
16. See p. 117 (“If the wrong of the lie is as insidious as I have argued, that wrong
supports a strong prima facie case for identifying and marking that wrong through the signal
of legal regulation and for using . . . powers of legal regulation to rebuke (and perhaps deter)
its occurrence.”).
17. See p. 217 (“[W]illingness to misrepresent reduces the basis others have to trust
whether the university’s other declarations are reliable . . . .”). Shiffrin acknowledges that while
“complete abstention from . . . misrepresentation might preclude the acquisition of certain
forms of knowledge . . . adhering to demands of sincerity may involve serious epistemic
losses. . . . [But this] is part . . . of moral, democratic life.” Pp. 216–17; see also p. 197 (“As-
sume (as against all likelihood) that, where deployed, direct misrepresentation is more episodi-
cally effective at gleaning important and accurate information than direct interview methods. I
would still contend that these lies, while understandable, are wrong. The police have institu-
tionally grounded reasons not to lie, even effectively, to achieve their valid and admirable
purposes.”).
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others are at issue—that it not only becomes psychologically difficult to re-
main truthful, but that, morally speaking, one ought to simply misrepresent
the truth.18
Consider Shiffrin’s Just War Theory example (pp. 24–25). The insight
here is two-fold. First, a scheme of moral requirements that allows us to
abrogate communicative duties—failing to properly honor the white flag—
would preclude us, in the circumstances she describes, from acting and en-
gaging as deliberative agents, as opposed to “reactive creature[s]” (p. 46).
With pathways to communication and deliberation closed, we find our only
avenues to escape the situation via violence and manipulation, rather than
through mutual engagement (p. 25). The point of the metaphor runs deeper
than merely noting the difficulty of escape from nonideal circumstances.
Second, in the context of complete communication breakdown, the very
pathways to human agency are blocked, so too are the pathways to moral
progress and ultimately redemption, via mutual engagement.19
If this is true in warfare, the most extreme of nonideal contexts, it holds
for more ordinary circumstances as well. The impetus to override our com-
municative duties, simpliciter, say, through the use of genuine broad-based
misrepresentations, even in the face of ostensibly overriding consequential
gain, and even “when an ‘innocent’ life is in jeopardy” (p. 44), may be un-
justified. Instead, there is a nearly absolute commitment to the value of
sincerity, couched in the very ideas of moral agency and then progress and
redemption (p. 45). “[T]here are actions we think we cannot perform and
rights that are not forfeited, even by wrongdoers, although our abstention
from these actions may represent a missed opportunity to prevent harm” (p.
45).
Speech Matters is self-consciously a work of nonideal theory, that is, a
discussion of the bindingness of normative requirements in the context of
actual or “real-world,” as opposed to idealized constructed or theoretical
conditions (p. 60),  so Shiffrin has license to depart from a set of liberties
that one would adopt under more theoretically ideal conditions. But the
circumstances of nonideal conditions cut in both directions: the distortions
imposed by extreme circumstances equally well strengthen duties surround-
ing security of the person, as opposed to those surrounding the value of
communication. Shiffrin makes a strong case for the white flag and its ties to
communication and agency (pp. 24–25), but in the context of nonideal the-
ory in which the stakes are high, one wonders if there is an equally strong
argument to be made in the direction of truncating communicative duties of
sincerity, based on security of the person. I suspect much would turn on
which factual realities are more conducive to moral agency.
18. See pp. 24–25.
19. See p. 37 (“There are important values . . . not confined to the wartime arena,
namely: that a peaceful avenue to social and moral reconciliation and redemption always be
open even to those who have strayed . . . .”).
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Shiffrin takes care to demonstrate the deontic foundation of her view.
When speaking under ordinary circumstances, we are taken to provide lis-
teners with reason to believe in the sincerity of communications.20 But when
others are acting wrongfully—say a mugger demanding the location of one’s
wallet, or an inquiring murderer asking the location of his would-be inno-
cent murder victim whom you are hiding—the morality of the situation
changes (pp. 33–34). In asking their questions, these characters do not pos-
sess any legitimate “moral expectation that communications on this subject
will be reliable, trustworthy, or otherwise provid[ing] a warrant” (p. 35).
Absent such initial good reason to believe, no moral wrong is committed in
misrepresenting the truth, so long as one’s misrepresentation is surgically
circumscribed (p. 35).
As one would hope, the duty of sincerity does not require that one be-
come an accomplice to murder, nor does it require that one aid or assist
criminals in pursuit of their immoral ends. Shiffrin is clear: morality in
truth telling does not require a wholesale revision of the criminal law of
accomplice. But, interestingly, for Shiffrin, the bounds of the criminal law of
accomplice (also) serve as essentially the contours of the justified suspension
of the duty to refrain from misrepresentation. When it comes to communi-
cations with wrongdoers, it is not the case that anything goes—and surpris-
ingly for many, short of being made into a criminal accomplice, one ought
to remain truthful.21 The idea is that requests for information concerning a
would-be victim’s location from an inquiring would-be murderer are, in a
sense, void ab initio; since there is no legitimate expectation that one be
truthful with regard to this specific subject, the duty not to misrepresent is
suspended (pp. 34–35).
But this approach threatens to justify a good deal more “suspension”
than Shiffrin might hope. Can it be true that the would-be murderer has no
legitimate moral expectation that one be truthful in providing the location
of a would-be victim, but does have a legitimate expectation that one will
provide truthful information concerning the state of the criminal law when
falsified information would peacefully deescalate a would-be murderer? That
view is plausible enough, but fails to provide the surgically circumscribed
account Shiffrin seeks, which she openly acknowledges (p. 36). Her rhetoric
would appear to answer the above question in the affirmative, but her theo-
retical approach appears to push in the opposite direction. Here, Shiffrin
draws a distinction between “misrepresenting information that would con-
stitute assistance in the commission of a crime” and “misrepresenting infor-
mation that would, in another way, stop or solve a crime” (p. 36). While
duties of sincerity do not require the former, they may be strong enough to
disallow the later. She holds that “one might . . . intentionally misrepresent
to the murderer” at the door, but that “that justification may nonetheless
20. See pp. 32–33 (describing situations that have or do not have a “presumption of
truthfulness”).
21. See pp. 35–37.
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have limits” that disallow telling “any and all intentional falsehoods that
would be useful” in stopping the crime (p. 40).
In the first case, there is no reasonable or legitimate expectation of
truthful representation, but in the second, things are different. Recall the
white flag (pp. 24–25). We ought to keep pathways to communication and
peaceful resolution open, even in dealing with evil aggressors; to construct a
rule of general application that countenances a “truth-free zone” in dealing
with wrongdoers would be to close, ex ante, the possibility of any open com-
munication or dialog. This would leave wrongdoers in complete isolation,
unable to communicate or seek knowledge that might create the circum-
stances of reform (p. 38).
Aptly making this abstract point concrete, Shiffrin discusses the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.22 In that case,
the Court upheld a statutory mandate against providing assistance to speci-
fied terrorist organizations, finding no First Amendment violation. The
Court maintained that speech indicating how to use legal means to end con-
flicts peacefully was, in the context of the statute, properly construed as pro-
viding “assistance.”23 Shiffrin describes the decision as “shocking”; her
concern is that “[i]n essence, the statute isolates those considered to be ter-
rorists from communicative assistance, even assistance aimed at using peace-
ful and lawful methods to . . . implement social change” (p. 37). For Shiffrin,
when the pathways to communication close, there is no deliberative way to
more ideal circumstances (p. 38).
Shiffrin carves out a middle ground: duties of sincerity should not allow
criminals to make us into accomplices, but it does not follow that anything,
by way of misrepresentation, goes.24 The matter becomes acute, however,
when one affirmatively indicates that one is being truthful to a wrongdoer.
“One is categorically prohibited from voluntarily offering the murderer con-
crete and material assistance in the commission of his crime” (p. 43). Yet
“one would go very wrong by volunteering gratuitously to the Murderer at
the Door that one does not regard the context [i.e., the duty to be truthful]
as justifiably suspended and that one really is telling the truth” (p. 43). The
crucial yet subtle point is this: we should devise a rule of social morality that
preserves a communicative way out of difficult or extreme  circumstances.25
This requires that there be some way to voice a “last word”26 when being
believed is not just left to the chances of psychological manipulation, but
that one indicates instead that one is reliable and to be believed, whether the
22. P. 37; 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728–31 (2010).
23. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2728.
24. P. 38 (“[T]he murderer cannot expect veridical statements that would constitute co-
operation with his nefarious enterprise, [however,] the arguments for that limited justified
suspended context do not justify placing [the murderer] in a wider arena of epistemic
isolation.”).
25. See pp. 45–46.
26. Thomas Nagel, The Last Word 101 (1997) (discussing ethics and a final
vocabulary).
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white flag in war or the utterance “I am really telling the truth” in the crimi-
nal context.27 Absent the conceptual space for such a “last word,” we and the
engaged aggressor would be left in utter communicative “isolation” or “soli-
tary confinement” (p. 38).
It is crucial that we preserve reliable communicative pathways even in
the worst circumstances  and even with aggressors pursuing criminal aims.28
Still, there is more to it: Shiffrin engages with communication and what she
calls “redemption.” The idea here is “that a peaceful avenue to social and
moral reconciliation and redemption always be open even to those who have
strayed” (p. 37). She points out that “even those who engage in wrong re-
main members of the moral community” and that “not all forms of con-
straint and respect owed to agents are inapplicable to wrongdoers; and that
the availability of this opportunity should not be confined to those who have
fully repented . . . because achieving such repentance and recognition is
usually a process that requires assistance from others” (pp. 37–38).
While Shiffrin has identified intriguing and morally salient features of
these situations, I am uncertain that these features are conclusive in con-
structing a complete set of universally binding rules that serve full moral
agency. Balancing is needed,  particularly when basic security of the person
itself is at stake and nonideal conditions obtain. I doubt such rule construc-
tions could directly pattern Shiffrin’s stringent duties of sincerity. Further,
when there might be functional overlap, the ultimate reasons behind such
rules would likely not be of the type Shiffrin urges. The normative basis of
any functionally overlapping construction may well draw from an opposing
direction.
B. Duress and Promise
Shiffrin presses her argument  further still by addressing the question of
fidelity in promising under duress (p. 48). If there are surprisingly stringent
limits to the bounds of justifiable misrepresentations in dealing with active
criminals, perhaps there are significantly more circumscribed limits to the
proper function of duress in vitiating promises. Much of the art of the navi-
gation and negotiation of life takes place under less than ideal or desirable
circumstances (p. 49). Our interactions with the world can be viewed along
27. P. 42 (“If we actively . . . deliver a declaration to the mugger, then we do wrong to
misrepresent, because we then implicitly affirm a principle that, if public, would undermine
our ability to exit the suspended context. An ethical permission to misrepresent would ob-
struct the believability of all of us to achieve such exit.”).
28. P. 31. Shiffrin describes misrepresentations about the legal status of the death penalty
and the effect of the criminal’s past record “to the legal disposition of his situation if he turns
himself in now rather than proceeding . . . to commit one final murder” as “wrongful lies.” P.
31. She continues: “I am terribly troubled by the negotiator misrepresenting to the hostage-
taker whether his requests have been or will be met, to effect a release of hostages,” and further
comments, “I believe these strategic lies are out of bounds,” and finally “condemn[ing] moral
misrepresentations . . . express[ing] false sympathy with the hostage-taker’s cause and meth-
ods, as well as misrepresentations by the police, when they attempt to elicit a confession
through false expressions of solidarity.” P. 31.
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a spectrum of voluntarism. At one extreme, one’s hands can be quite liter-
ally forced by those of another (p. 47). But one also makes choices under less
than ideal circumstances ranging from cases of genuine duress to more ordi-
nary hard choices.
Once again, Shiffrin has a brilliant—if counterintuitive—insight: even
in the context of genuine duress, we have constrained choices and these
choices may serve as a pathway out of difficult or extreme  circumstances.
Even in the face of an armed gunman asking for one’s precious watch, one
might negotiate settlement, say, if one attaches idiosyncratic value to the
watch but can offer its market value in cash  instead. Shiffrin observes that
even while under genuine duress, parties may be able to engage their agency
to navigate a pathway out; there is, even under such substandard conditions,
room to maneuver, to actively engage, or, so to speak, to privately order a
“workout.”29
This maneuvering room, however, requires a reformation of the morality
of promise keeping. To negotiate under duress, one must have the liberty to
offer promises, which need to be taken seriously, that is, be understood as
binding (p. 58). Absent the possibility of a gunman-listener with warrant to
believe that an unscripted promise—that, for Shiffrin, goes beyond the gun-
man’s initial demand, and is, in some sense, authored and advanced by his
victim—is binding, the two are unable to engage their moral agency. Quite
simply, absent belief in the possibility that the victim will make good on his
word, he has no leverage in negotiation, agency cannot be engaged, and the
parties are both left to the accidents of manipulation, force, or chance (p.
58).
This is a two-way street. When the gunman has no warrant to take vic-
tim-offered promises seriously, he too is isolated from communication and
the mutual engagement of agency that, for Shiffrin, represents the rudiments
of the pathway to reform and the building blocks of moral progress.30 Pick-
ing up the tread of the earlier argument—that we must, in certain respects,
remain truthful to those actively engaged in wrongdoing—Shiffrin main-
tains that under circumscribed circumstances, promises offered under du-
ress should be morally binding.31
For Shiffrin, in standard circumstances, “a promise to phi at time t di-
vests the promisor of her right to reconsider whether to phi, that is, her right
to entertain any and all considerations that bear on whether to phi at t” (p.
65). Typically, “[t]hat right is transferred to the promisee who may demand
29. P. 58. By analogy, the United States Bankruptcy Code allows for—in fact encour-
ages—privately structured prebankruptcy workouts, that is, contractual arrangements, entered
into even under dire conditions. See 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (2012); In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24
B.R. 1014, 1016 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (“[T]he workout is sensible. Workouts contemplate,
indeed, depend upon, participation from all parties in interest, good faith, conciliation, and
candor. The alternative is litigation and its bedfellows—bluff, pettifoggery, and strife.”).
30. See pp. 25–26.
31. See p. 58.
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or waive performance by the promisor” (p. 65). But in the  context of du-
ress, she describes the situation differently: “[T]he promisor divests her stan-
dard power fully to reconsider whether to phi at the time of performance.
But, . . . this divestment is decoupled from a right to demand performance
of the promisor by the promisee” (p. 65). She concludes that “the promise
has some moral force, but of a different sort than the moral force of stan-
dard promises, both because the promisee is not directly empowered by the
promise initiated under duress and because third parties need not enforce
the initiated promise on the promisee’s behalf” (p. 65; emphasis ad-
ded).While persisting in attributing morally binding force to promises made
under duress, yet continuing to contrast the morally salient aspects of them
with promises made under standard conditions, Shiffrin holds that, “the
substandard . . . formation (that block[s] the transfer of a right to demand
performance of the promise) may also affect how complete the divestiture of
the normative power to reconsider is,” and that this “may explain why the
promise has moral force but may not strictly bind the promisor to the full
terms of its original content” (p. 65). So, the moral force of the promissory
arrangement is retained—albeit under significantly less stringent terms than
under standard conditions. A conception of the principle of fidelity obtains.
C. Duress and Contract
The assertion that promises offered under such  circumstances should
be kept naturally invites the question whether such promises should be con-
tractually binding. If such promises are binding, morally speaking, should
we also reform contract law to accommodate binding promissory relations?
Shiffrin answers this question in the negative, noting first that in her analysis
there is no right to third-party support, and second that promissory princi-
ples and contract law diverge. She holds that while a qualified principle of
fidelity32 requires that one keep such promises, the private law of contract
should not enforce them (pp. 69–70).
There is, of course, a gap between norms of promising and contract law;
there is no one-to-one mapping between the two.33 Contract law, for exam-
ple, requires consideration and does not enforce gratuitous promises; fur-
ther, contractual remedies do not pattern our practices of promise keeping.34
Consider contract law’s reluctance to require specific performance35 and the
use of efficient breach.36 Shiffrin implicitly distinguishes between normative
principles that govern interpersonal relations—for example, the morality of
mere promissory relations, and those that also apply to institutions, such as
32. Pp. 69–70 (describing the qualified principle of fidelity).
33. See p. 70.
34. See Shiffrin, supra note 2.
35. Id. at 722.
36. Id. at 730–31; see also Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107
Mich. L. Rev. 1551 (2009).
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contract law.37 The justification for the asymmetry turns upon “a concep-
tion of the larger mission and broader meaning of contract law” (p. 70).
Because contract law is in no small measure an institutional, as opposed
to merely an interpersonal, matter,38 differing normative principles or values
apply.39 In contrast to merely interpersonal promissory relationships,
“[c]ontract law is the primary social institution dedicated to both the facili-
tation of promises as well as their enforcement, while simultaneously operat-
ing as one component of our joint project of creating social resources and
distributing them in a fair manner” (p. 70; emphases added). Contrasting
contract law with promising, Shiffrin writes, “contract law should accom-
modate the ability of citizens to fulfill their duties and live moral lives” (p.
70); but, the law of duress “should not prohibit or interfere with perform-
ance by willing promisors” (p. 70). She continues, “[b]ut, were the legal
institution of contract to enforce promises made under duress . . . it would
throw the weight of the community behind the aims of the coercer, even
though the moral argument for fidelity does not establish any moral right or
claim of the promisee to performance” (p. 70; emphasis added).
This qualified promissory fidelity and the corresponding account of the
divergence between promise and contract, however, may not sit well with
libertarians or genuine proponents of the autonomy or ex post conception
of contract law, in which there is a demand for a one-to-one pairing be-
tween contract law and promise or other genuine deontic requirements.40
But, Shiffrin works carefully to justify the divergence; she holds that because
there is no right on behalf of the “victimizer” to demand performance and
there is no right to third-party assistance, analogously, there is no right to
contractual enforcement.41 While this qualified-promise explanation goes
some distance in meeting the “will theorist,” the view would still appear to
give primacy to ex ante theories of contract law—those most antithetical to
the autonomy or “contract as promise” account of contract law.42 What the
contractual status of Shiffrin’s “qualified promises” offered under duress
might be in the hands of a committed “will” or “autonomy” theorist re-
mains an open question. One wonders if the ex post theorist would have
grounds for objection, were such arrangements taken to be contractually or
37. See p. 70.
38. Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 730–31; see also Shiffrin, supra note 36.
39. See p. 70.
40. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation
17 (2d ed. 2015).
41. See pp. 70–71.
42. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 152–55 (9th ed. 2014);
Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
598, 615–16 (2005) (maintaining that Rawlsianism is consistent with the ex ante conception of
contract law, but conflicts, at the level of principle with the ex post conception of contract
law); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 472 (1980);
Samuel Scheffler, Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of Private Law, 35 Ox-
ford J. Legal Stud. 213 (2015) (discussing Rawlsian distributive justice and private law’s role
in the basic structure of society).
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otherwise legally binding, and if so, whether he or she would persist in con-
sidering such arrangements—even if in a qualified sense—actually promis-
sory as Shiffrin does?
Below, I discuss this divergence while contrasting it with an account of
promising and private ordering, rooted in ideals of fairness and distributive
justice associated with a Rawlsian conception of justice; interestingly, a start-
ing place that Shiffrin herself at times embraces,43 although she ultimately
departs from it at the conceptual level.44 Indeed, one way to interpret Shif-
frin is as providing a stridently Kantian (pp. 49–50) or “pre-institutional,”
liberal alternative to Rawls45 or even a corrective to Rawlsianism. In con-
trasting Speech Matters with the outline of a Rawlsian distributive approach,
I do not intend a criticism. Rather, I intend to point out the distinct manner
in which these two foundationally deontic positions diverge, even given sim-
ilar starting positions.46
Shiffrin discusses the divergence of contract law from promise as a mat-
ter of our de facto promissory practices, on one hand, and the positive law,
on the other; arguing that given the divergence, contract law still ought to
instrumentally accommodate certain aspects of moral life.47 In this view,
morality should, in some measure, affect contract law by articulating quali-
fied-normative demands that contract law ought to accommodate. But
Speech Matters does not begin with de facto morality in the context of prom-
ising. Shiffrin aims to significantly reform our practice of promising to allow
for a “qualified” principle of fidelity to be binding (pp. 69–70). Speech Mat-
ters does not, to be clear, depart from Shiffrin’s earlier position. Instead, she
simply finds little reason for the institution of contract law, in its capacity as
43. Shiffrin does not name Rawls specifically, but invokes the Rawlsian methodology of
understanding certain basic liberties as taking “lexical priority.” See p. 26.
44. P. 168 (noting, in the context of accommodation, “I will situate the problem within a
framework that is, roughly, Rawlsian, although the Rawlsian framework is essential neither to
the ultimate conception nor to the solution to the problem”).
45. For Rawls, basic liberties guaranteed by the first principle of justice do not pattern
Kantian comprehensive moral doctrine or Kantian notions of autonomy of the kind Shiffrin
invokes. Consider H.L.A. Hart’s remarks on Rawlsian basic liberties, that such liberties may
“refer[ ] not to ‘liberty’ but to basic or fundamental liberties, which are understood to be
legally recognised and protected from interference,” H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its
Priority, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 534, 538 (1973), and correctly diagnosing “important differences
between Rawls’s doctrine of liberty and Kant’s conception of mutual freedom under universal
law.” Id. at 538 n.19. Rawls embraces Hart’s suggestion: “Hart noted, however . . . , that in A
Theory of Justice I sometimes used arguments and phrases which suggest that the priority of
liberty as such is meant; although, as he saw, this is not the correct interpretation.” John
Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority (Apr. 10, 1981), in 3 The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values 1, 6 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982).
46. Rawls is committed to Kantianism, but his deontology does not take the form of
Shiffrin’s. For Rawls, the Kantianism is found in the construction of the original position, not
in the practical application of the two principles of justice. See Thomas Nagel, Justice and
Nature, 17 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 303, 306 (1997) (“Rawls’s approach is theoretically deonto-
logical in foundation, though its development leads in a consequentialist (but nonutilitarian)
direction.”).
47. Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 709.
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an instrument of social justice, to accommodate her counterintuitive re-
formist account of interpersonal  promissory relations.48 One wonders if the
very reasons she takes to defeat the moral demand for accommodation of
the latter, also defeat the plausibility of the bindingness of the former.
III. Individuals and Institutions
A. Promises and Fidelity
When a principle of fidelity, that is, a principle enjoining the obligation
to keep one’s promises, is invoked, a certain form of normative complexity
arises. This complexity cannot be avoided by distinguishing between princi-
ples for individuals and principles for institutions and relying on reasons,
however plausible, for the maintenance of a gap between the two, as I ex-
plain, albeit in somewhat Rawlsian terms. The very practice of promising is
itself a social institution.49 The institution of promise keeping is a set of rules
that delineates which of our commitments are morally binding obligations;
the institution defines the very terms of the answer to the question of what
counts as a promise; further and importantly, the principle of promissory
fidelity, the very demand that one ought to keep one’s promises, is binding
or regulatory only if predicated on an antecedently just set of promissory
rules.50 It is essential that rules constitutive of the practice of promising, on
which any principle of promissory fidelity is predicated or binding, be just.51
Setting aside for a moment questions of contract law, the question of
promissory fidelity becomes acute in any promissory scheme that takes non-
contractual (that is, non-legally binding) economic promissory obligations
or economic transactions to be morally binding. As noted above, Shiffrin
recognizes an analogous point: “[c]ontract law is the . . . social institution
dedicated to . . . the facilitation of promises . . . while simultaneously operat-
ing as one component of our joint project of creating social resources and
distributing them in a fair manner” (p. 70; emphases added). But when par-
ties make promises over details of ownership and invoke economic ex-
change, the very institution of promising itself, in conjunction with contract
law, property, and the system of taxation and transfer, is a component of the
complete set of economic institutions.52 When property and the details of
ownership are at stake, it is not at all clear that one may, without normative
48. See p. 70.
49. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 303 (rev. ed. 2003).
50. Id. at 303–04.
51. Id.
52. P. 70. In discussing distribution, Shiffrin acknowledges that contract law may play a
role in conjunction with property law and the system of taxation, but excludes the practice of
promising. “[C]ontract law itself is not the major offender here in failing to instantiate distrib-
utive justice. That finger should be pointed in the general direction of property law and our
tax system.” P. 70; cf. Rawls, supra note 49, at 304 (“It must suffice to remark that the princi-
ples of justice apply to the practice of promising in the same way that they apply to other
institutions.”).
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objection, disconnect the rules governing promises so distinctly from rules
governing the details of ownership and exchange.53
B. Shiffrin’s Reforms and Principles for Just Institutions
Here, a distinction between principles for institutions and principles for
individuals is instructive. Rawls, for example, introduces his original posi-
tion-derived54 two principles of justice that govern social institutions.55 But
he also discusses moral requirements that regulate the conduct of individu-
als, which he describes as natural duties.56 To elaborate briefly, Rawls’s first
principle of justice, understood to take lexical priority over the second, con-
structs a system of equal basic liberties—for example, security of the person,
the right to hold personal property, freedom of thought and conscience,
freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary search and seizure—sufficient
to the full exercise of what Rawls—and Shiffrin—both describe as the two
moral powers.57 Rawls’s second principle of justice requires that all eco-
nomic inequalities be arranged to maximize the position of the least well-
off, subject to an equal opportunity constraint.58 For Rawls, then, the eco-
nomic details of expansive bodies of property law and ownership, beyond
mere personal property, systems of taxation and transfer, the law of contract
and economic exchange, the law of business organization, intellectual prop-
erty, etc., are properly understood as second-principle economic construc-
tions.59 Rawls further distinguishes these two principles from another set of
original position-derived principles for individuals, the natural duties, which
I return to below. But first, I return to Shiffrin and the duty of fidelity in
promise keeping.
One wonders if Shiffrin misdraws the line between principles for indi-
viduals and principles for institutions, characterizing the practice of promis-
ing as subject to the former, as opposed to the latter. In my view, the rules
governing the practice of promise keeping—if it is to exist—is a function,
not of duties for individuals, but principles for institutions, in Rawlsianism,
53. See p. 70.
54. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 14 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
(describing Rawls’s original position as an idealized social-choice scenario in which represent-
atives select political and economic principles so as to maximize their self-interest under con-
ditions of less than perfect knowledge from behind a veil of ignorance).
55. Id. at 42–43 (“[First Principle:] Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all; and [Second Principle:] Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle).”).
56. Rawls, supra note 49, at 293–301.
57. See p. 168; Rawls, supra note 54, at 18–19.
58. Rawls, supra note 54, at 42.
59. Id. at 42–43.
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the two principles of justice.60 But now the matter becomes further compli-
cated and is not merely one of a textual mislocation on Shiffrin’s part; once
one acknowledges that the practice of promising is itself subject to principles
for institutions, namely, the two principles of justice, one must recognize
that any economic aspects to the practice of promising are to be constructed
instrumentally, in service of the maximizing demand of the second principle
of justice, in conjunction with all other economic constructions.61
My concern is that even Shiffrin’s qualified principle of fidelity in the
context of duress would not survive this Rawlsian construction. This is par-
ticularly true when the promise in question involves economic exchange or
alterations in the ground rules governing the details of ownership. For ex-
ample, consider “voluntarily” authoring and offering up a promise to
switch—while threatened at gun point—terms of ownership, say, between
property and liability rule protection;62 the just scheme of rules governing
promissory relations, aimed at maximizing the least well-off, is just simply
unlikely to admit of such contractualist latitude. Although Shiffrin operates
in nonideal theory, it is unclear that this will turn the trick: her analysis of
the promissory rule is too much about agency and voluntarism and not
enough about the goal of distributive or economic justice.
C. Duress and Institutional Design
Now—to be clear—this does not mean that Shiffrin’s promissory rule
could not ultimately be adopted in a Rawlsian scheme. As noted above, there
could be functional overlap with the rule Shiffrin advocates, but if her rule
were so adopted, it would be adopted for reasons different from those she
offers. Like Shiffrin’s view, Rawlsianism is, at its foundation, deontic. But for
Rawls, the deontology is found in the assumptions that construct the origi-
nal position. Moving forward from the original position, the two principles
of justice, once adopted, operate in tandem to construct the complete
scheme of rules constitutive of social institutions63—inclusive of promise
practices—in an instrumentalist fashion.64 Interestingly for Rawls, were a
promissory rule akin to Shiffrin’s to be selected, its adoption would be a
60. See Rawls, supra note 49, at 304 (“I shall not regard promising as a practice which is
just by definition . . . . There are many variations of promising just as there are of the law of
contract. Whether the particular practice as it is understood . . . is just remains to be deter-
mined by the principles of justice.” (emphasis added)).
61. See id. at 303–04 (“In general, the circumstances giving rise to a promise and the
excusing conditions must be defined so as to preserve the equal liberty of the parties and to
make the practice a rational means whereby men can enter into and stabilize cooperative agree-
ments for mutual advantage.” (emphasis added)).
62. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1105–10 (1972) (drawing a
distinction between liability- and property-rule protection).
63. See Rawls, supra note 54, at 42–43.
64. See Rawls, supra note 49, at 304
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function of the very consequentialist reasons that Shiffrin acknowledges but
ultimately disavows.65
Shiffrin asks, in effect, that in selecting between promissory schemes, we
pick among at least two, our present scheme that does not allow for the
moral enforcement of promises offered under duress versus her reformist
scheme that does.66 But what is striking is the manner in which one would
reason in making this decision, were one a Rawlsian. One might, for exam-
ple, evaluate Shiffrin’s reformist scheme along the first principle dimension,
in the context of security of the person. One would reason that Shiffrin’s
provision would allow for the consequential benefits of privately ordered
“workouts” or “self-rescue” in case of duress, but at the same time recognize
that the rule would ex ante create perverse incentives to criminal conduct.
This is quite distinct from Shiffrin’s direct deontic appeal to preinstitutional
Kantian conceptions of mutual agency.
D. Individuals and Institutions
Return now to the normative principles for individuals mentioned
above. For Rawls, principles for individuals are derived in the original posi-
tion.67 This is, however, quite unlike Shiffrin’s view where such duties are
understood as Kantian preinstitutional duties.68 Rawls provides an example
of how such duties are constructed. By way of example, he discusses the duty
to help “another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do
so without excessive risk or loss to oneself.”69 This duty is adopted in the
original position, not for preinstitutional Kantian reasons of the sort Shiffrin
embraces, but instead because representatives in the original position reason
in consequentialist fashion that ex ante the duty would generate individual
benefit at limited cost.
65. Pp. 1, 26, 49–50. By way of contrast, for Rawlsianism, Shiffrin’s account may be too
reliant upon her commitment to comprehensive Kantian preinstitutional notions of autonomy
and responsibility, as opposed to postinstitutional liberty constructed in service of distributive
principles of justice. For a discussion of the distinction between pre- and postinstitutional
conceptions of justice, see Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private
Law, and Distributive Justice, Soc. Phil. &SC Pol’y, July 2006, at 142, and in the context of
private ordering, see Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Blankfein Tabachnick, The Rawlsian View
of Private Ordering, Soc. Phil. & Pol’y, July 2008, at 288.
66. See pp. 70–73.
67. George Klosko, Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice, 23 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 251, 254 (1994); see also Rawls, supra note 49, at 93 (“I have considered the principles
which apply to institutions or, more exactly, to the basic structure of society. It is clear, how-
ever, that principles of another kind must also be chosen, since a complete theory of right
includes principles for individuals as well.”).
68. See Christopher Heath Wellman & A. John Simmons, Is There a Duty to
Obey the Law? 156 n.38 (2005) (“[T]he natural duties actually discussed by Rawls are not
‘natural’ in any very strong sense, but are only the ‘postinstitutional’ moral duties that original
position reasoners would select to bind themselves in their subsequent interactions. As such,
much of the discussion to follow may seem to be aimed at a Rawls who is more Kantian than
Rawls actually wished to be.”).
69. Rawls, supra note 49, at 98.
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Rawls, like Shiffrin, addresses the divergence between principles for in-
dividuals and principles for institutions, but the two differ. For Rawls, the
original position-derived duties for individuals must be given content by the
principles of justice.70 The principles of justice are to be selected in the origi-
nal position, first. “The important thing is that the various principles are to
be adopted in a definite sequence . . . .”71 Further, “the sequence . . . reflects
the fact that obligations presuppose principles for social forms” and that
duties for individuals “presuppose such principles.”72
Because the duties that apply to individuals require normative property
and economic baselines drawn from the principles of justice, the natural
duties cannot be entirely divorced from principles of justice. There is a con-
ceptual connection between duties for individuals and principles for institu-
tions. This becomes clear where Rawls discusses and rejects the utility
principle as a principle for the regulation of individual duties on the basis of
the possibility of conflict with the two principles of justice. The two sets of
principles operate in tandem.73 So duties for individuals, although derived
separately in the original position, are importantly dependent upon the ante-
cedent property baselines and details of ownership, as well as the scheme of
legal and political institutions constructed by the two principles of justice.
Rawls discusses the duty not to injure and the duty not to harm the inno-
cent; what exactly constitutes injury and harm is determined postinstitu-
tionally by the two principles of justice.74 This would hold true for the
bounds of, any original position-derived duty of sincerity or any prohibition
on lying.75
The preceding discussion may illuminate the plausibility of stringent
duties against lying that Shiffrin advocates. Consider again the bounds of an
individual duty not to lie to wrongdoers engaged in criminal activity. One
70. For a discussion of natural duties and the private law of tort and the principled
conflict with the value of corrective justice in a Rawlsian scheme, see Kevin A. Kordana &
David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Corrective Justice, 92 Va. L. Rev.
1279, 1290 (2006).
71. Rawls, supra note 49, at 93.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 294 (“[T]he choice of principles for individuals is greatly simplified by the
fact that the principles for institutions have already been adopted. The feasible alternatives are
straightway narrowed down to those that constitute a coherent conception of duty and obliga-
tion when taken together with the two principles of justice . . . . [L]et us suppose that the
persons in the original position, having agreed to the two principles of justice, entertain the
choice of the principle of utility . . . as the standard for the acts of individuals. . . . [This]
would lead to an incoherent conception of right. The criteria for institutions and individuals
do not fit together properly.”).
74. See Rawls, supra note 54, at 42–43.
75. Note, for Rawls, the very meaning of these terms, importantly, is not understood in
ordinary terms or language, because the inclusion conditions of these concepts are constructed
by the principles of justice. Rawls writes that “the concept of something’s being right is the
same as, or better, may be replaced by, the concept of its being in accordance with the princi-
ples that in the original position would be acknowledged to apply to things of its kind.”
Rawls, supra note 49, at 95.
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may share Shiffrin’s sentiment that not just “anything goes” (pp. 36–37).
But, one might be skeptical of the narrow metes and bounds of permission
she grants, given that any such stringent duty not to lie would need to be
independently cost justified in the original position and also be consistent
with a property construction, instrumental to the maximizing demand of
the second principle of justice. In Shiffrin’s discussion, security of the person
and economic arrangements loom large, and the conceptual space for her
stringent constraints is unlikely to exist (pp. 186–99).
Shiffrin’s position also diverges from a Rawlsian account in her discus-
sion of freedom of speech in the university and university-managerial discre-
tion and authority. In discussing her view of the relationship between
efficiency and the freedom of speech, Shiffrin objects to Robert Post’s invo-
cation of Connick v. Myers76 and his account of managerial efficiency in gov-
ernment, public, or university operations as “presuppos[ing] criteria of
success that valorize smooth and quickly executed hierarchical relations” (p.
208). She argues that such efficiency, however useful in business organiza-
tions, is not suited to public democratic institutions including universities.77
Shiffrin contrasts Post’s position with her presumably more normatively
laudable democratic approach in which the university “operates as a public
forum in which independently minded speech is invited for its own sake, for
the sake of its members, and for the sake of the broader community” (p.
212). But Post, problematically for Shiffrin, distinguishes between categories
of First Amendment coverage, distinguishing between democratic “legiti-
macy” (for example, the public square) and mere democratic “competence”
(for example, the university classroom).78 The former domain is understood
to be significantly more open and free, while the latter is, of necessity, com-
paratively less protective of freedom of expression, given the need for judg-
ment, regulation, and evaluation in the imparting of degree-worthy
knowledge, sufficient to democratic competence. Correspondingly, Post
maintains that a university might constrain freedom of expression, as com-
pared with the freedom of expression allowed in the public square (p. 212).
By way of analogy, consider a Rawlsian account of categories of rules
governing expression in the advertising context. Here, one must distinguish
among (1) the liberties surrounding basic “political”79 speech and (2)
nonbasic (that is, nonconstitutional), second principle of justice, liberties
surrounding (i) equal opportunity in, say, advertising for jobs, (ii) the liber-
ties and regulations surrounding, say, advertising in the context of consumer
information, and (iii) market-strategic advertising. In a Rawlsian view, even
76. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
77. See pp. 208, 211–12.
78. See Robert C. Post, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First
Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State (2012).
79. Rawls, supra note 45, at 77.
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the right to basic political speech must be adjusted to construct a well-bal-
anced “family”80 of basic liberties and, of course, not all speech is basic.81 So
crucially, the principles of justice apply differently to different forms of
speech.82 To continue with the advertising example, the first principle of
justice may protect some political advertising, although clearly in a nonab-
solute fashion. Other advertising speech would be a function of the second
principle of justice’s opportunity constraint, and the bounds of liberties
concerning commercial advertising in (1) the dissemination of crucial con-
sumer information83 and (2) “market-strategic”84 advertising are constructed
by the difference principle, maximizing the position of the least well-off.85
Now, return to the dispute between Shiffrin and Post over efficiency in the
university. By analogy with advertising, the rules protecting even political
speech in a university must find a home in a balanced family of basic rights,
none of which is absolute. Further, even when certain components of uni-
versity function or classroom speech are political in nature, it is certainly not
the case that all of it is political or basic. Indeed, for Rawlsianism, many of
the rules governing speech are second-principle-of-justice constructions,
thereby regulated by distributive, as opposed to First Amendment,
concerns.86
Institutions such as universities have a significant impact on the distri-
bution of primary goods (for example, consider universities’ tax-exempt sta-
tus, acceptance of government-subsidized student loans, impact on well-
being via essential medical research, and the cultivation of human excellence
80. Id. at 72 (“[T]he basic liberties constitute a family, and that it is this family that has
priority and not any single liberty by itself.”); id. at 74. (“Political speech may be regulated in
order to preserve the fair-value of the political liberties. . . . These regulations do not restrict
the content of political speech and hence may be consistent with its central role. . . . [T]he
mutual adjustment of the basic liberties is justified on grounds allowed by the priority of these
liberties as a family, no one of which is absolute.”).
81. Id. at 80.
82. Id. at 83 (“[T]he protection for different kinds of advertising varies depending on
whether it is connected with political speech, or with maintaining fair equality of opportunity,
or with preserving a workably competitive and efficient system of markets.”).
83. Id. at 80. Rawls contrasts dissemination of information via advertising with political
speech: “The law may impose penalties for inaccurate or false information, which it cannot do
in the case of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience” and too “for the protection of
consumers the law can require that information about harmful and dangerous properties of
goods be clearly described on the label.” Id. Further, the law may render it “forbidden for
firms, or for trade and professional associations, to make agreements to limit or not to engage
in this kind of advertising,” and “[t]he legislature may require, for example, that prices and
accurate information about commodities be readily accessible to the public.” Id. Rawls con-
cludes that “[s]uch measures help to maintain a competitive and efficient system of markets
and enable consumers to make more intelligent and informed decisions.” Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 81 (“Much of this kind of advertising is socially wasteful . . . [t]he funds now
devoted to [it] can be released for investment or for other useful social ends.”).
86. Cf. Renee Newman Knake, Legal Information, the Consumer Law Market, and the First
Amendment, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2843 (2014) (discussing an expansive conception of First
Amendment protection).
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and talent) and are subject to the two principles of justice. But the revised
first principle requires merely sufficient basic liberty, the measure of freedom
of speech necessary to construct a complete scheme of basic liberties suffi-
cient to the full exercise of the two moral powers.87 Now it is true, as Rawls
notes, that the structure of the university is not to be “read off” the two
principles of justice;88 the rules of such structure must find a home in the
complete scheme of legal and political rules that instrumentally serve the
two distributive principles.89 There is room here for an instrumentalist divi-
sion of labor between various institutions.
Still, when there is a demand that the overall scheme of legal and politi-
cal rules maximizes the position of the least well-off, Shiffrin cannot be so
certain that, qua justice, Post is off base once sufficient basic liberty is estab-
lished through social, political, and legal institutions that are inclusive of
political speech. In this account, it is not clear that Post is merely valorizing
or presupposing efficiency; institutional waste—even in a university—is a
hazard to a scheme that must maximize the position of the least well-off. On
the other hand, we may be able to pick up the “slack” in primary goods in
other areas. But given universities’ size and function, it would be odd to
think that a managerial strategy, like the one Post advocates, sensitive to
protection of adequate freedom of expression, would be obviously norma-
tively objectionable because it requires a measure of economic efficiency.
It is true that the first principle of justice would rule out certain mana-
gerial strategies, for example, those requiring strict wealth maximization,
and would likely rule out any general prohibition on compelled speech or
preordained protection of commercial speech. The second principle of jus-
tice would also preclude a wide range of managerial strategies. But it is not
clear that a measure of efficiency highly constrained by an adequate scheme
of balanced First Amendment values, compatible with basic liberty sufficient
to the full exercise of the two moral powers, is objectionable qua Rawlsian
justice.
To be clear, Shiffrin does not purport to present a Rawlsian position.
Instead, she shares in several Rawlsian starting points, but ends with distinct
conclusions.90 In drawing the contrast, I hope to illuminate the difficulty
involved in the construction of a complete scheme of social, political, and
legal institutions, as well as duties for individuals, while holding Shiffrin’s
stringent normative commitments constant.91
87. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 70, at 1301; see Rawls, supra note 54, at 18, 42–43
(discussing the two moral powers and the revised first principle of justice).
88. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 70, at 1307.
89. Id.
90. Scholars have discussed Shiffrin as a “neolibertarian.” See John D. Inazu, Liberty’s
Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly 10–13 (2012) (distinguishing between Rawl-
sian liberalism and neolibertarianism); see also Andrew Koppelman with Tobias Barring-
ton Wolff, A Right to Discriminate? 63 (2009) (characterizing Shiffrin as
“neolibertarian”).
91. My concern is a general problem of institutional design, namely, that independent
metrics of normative appraisal or isolated stringent normative demands can conflict with
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Shiffrin takes care to address human weakness in her discussion of ac-
commodation; but she backs off her strident admonishment of insincerity in
favor of the accommodation of human or psychological failings out of char-
ity or kindness.92 But given the stringency of the moral demand for sincerity,
the normative force of charity or generosity becomes unclear. Even when
saving lives may be at stake, misrepresentation is to be traded in favor of
sincerity. It is hard, then, to find the normative grounds for institutional
rules that trade sincerity away in favor of benevolence.
In contrasting Shriffin’s view with Rawlsianism, there is a third possibil-
ity, which sculpts an appealing normative path between Kantian near-abso-
lutism and utilitarianism. This view shares in many of Shiffrin’s initial
deontic commitments but ultimately provides a framework for blending and
balancing a plurality of values that serve as preconditions for moral agency,
while attending to justice in economic distribution.
Shiffrin does discuss social, political, and legal institutions in the context
of policing and the university, applying her earlier views on lying to these
institutions. The discussion is rich and unsurprisingly forthright in admon-
ishing lying in police interrogation, law enforcement’s misrepresentation of
basic legal rights (pp. 195–96), lying to research subjects, and any university
practice of suspending a duty of sincerity in efforts to obtain significant
human welfare-oriented medical or scientific gain (p. 217). While Shiffrin’s
concern that the status quo embodies too much misrepresentation may be
well-taken, it is a little less clear exactly how, for Shiffrin, institutional rules
in this regard should be designed and what the precise bounds of any “sus-
pension” of duty should be (p. 186).
broader maximizing principles of justice or the justified scheme of political and legal rules
constructed by such principles. See, e.g., Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of
Ownership: Taxes and Justice (2002) (discussing independent metrics of fairness in taxa-
tion); David H. Blankfein-Tabachnick, Intellectual Property Doctrine and Midlevel Principles,
101 Calif. L. Rev. 1315 (2013) (arguing that midlevel intellectual property principles are
insufficient to explain or predict the outcomes of cases, and that such principles conflict with
certain foundational accounts of property); George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justice for Moderns,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 1658, 1669 (1993) (book review) (discussing the value of corrective justice
in the context of the institution of tort law and noting that corrective justice “is not an absolute
demand of justice and morality,” and that it “is not immanent in the tort system . . . . [n]or
does it provide a bulwark against economic and regulatory reasoning in tort law” (emphasis
added)); cf. Robert P. Merges, Foundations and Principles Redux: A Reply to Professor Blankfein-
Tabachnick, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 1361 (2013) (arguing that the four midlevel intellectual prop-
erty principles—proportionality, efficiency, nonremoval of public domain enhancement, and
dignity—are consistent with foundational commitments).
92. Pp. 163–64 (arguing that, in cases of “personal insecurity, coupled with negligence
toward others and insufficient respect for the importance of maintaining the social fabric and
its strength,” Shiffrin holds that “accommodating such flaws through forbearance from legal
rebuke is a way publicly to manifest compassion and understanding for one another’s short-
comings. In so doing, we demonstrate the strength of our inclusivity” (footnote omitted)).
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Conclusion
Speech Matters is a superb book. This Review articulates several of its
intellectually rich and carefully argued themes while identifying fault lines in
its qualified absolutism, suggesting that the view may have difficulty finding
a conceptual home in a complete scheme of moral, social, and political rules
that themselves serve some of the very values Shiffrin initially embraces.
That said, even if one stops short of Shiffrin’s avowed near-absolutism, one
is absolutely convinced that she has isolated precisely what is at stake, and
the morally salient aspects of the world that might be traded away if one
does not follow her all the way to her conclusions. Speech Matters will spark
significant debate among scholars of philosophy, the private law, freedom of
expression, and institutional design. This important work provides a rare
opportunity to engage with the careful and keenly morally sensitive ideas,
insights, and arguments of one of the very best legal theorists we have.
